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1907 
THE FATAL FLAW OF STANDING: A PROPOSAL 
FOR AN ARTICLE I TRIBUNAL FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Emphasis on environmental protection has exploded in the past forty 
years. However, federal court doctrines have failed to evolve with the 
changing landscape of environmental law. Article III limits federal court 
judicial power to “cases and controversies.”1 From this requirement, the 
Supreme Court developed prerequisites that a plaintiff must meet to bring 
suit. One such requirement is the standing doctrine.2 Standing’s purpose is 
“to ensure . . . that the scarce resources of the federal courts are devoted to 
those disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake.”3 Commentators 
frequently criticize the theoretical holes in the Court’s current articulation 
of the standing doctrine, finding that it “produce[s] confusion, intellectual 
dishonesty, and chaos.”4 Moreover, it is often difficult for environmental 
plaintiffs to prove standing’s three constitutional requirements of injury, 
causation, and redressability.5 By establishing an Article I tribunal for 
environmental claims, plaintiffs would escape the intellectually suspect 
limitations created by the Court’s standing doctrine.  
This Note is divided into eight sections. After the introduction in Part I, 
Part II traces the history of federal environmental legislation. Parts III and 
IV present an abbreviated history of standing and environmental standing 
cases. Part V traces the development of Article I tribunals and the public 
rights doctrine. Next, Part VI analyzes the Court’s application of its 
 
 
 1. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003) (internal quotations omitted); 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–62 (1992) (contrasting judicial cases and 
controversies with executive inquiries, which bear the name “case,” and legislative disputes, which 
bear the name “controversies”).  
 2. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 225. 
 3. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000).  
 4. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 290 (1988). 
 5. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560–62. For an interesting discussion of how the current 
standing doctrine is too restrictive and how other countries’ expansive view of standing is preferable, 
see Jon Owens, Comparative Law and Standing to Sue: A Petition for Redress for the Environment, 7 
ENVTL. LAW 321 (2001) (Australia, Britain, Canada, India, Italy, Netherlands, Greece, Philippines, 
South Africa, Brazil, and Pakistan); Philip Weinberg, Unbarring the Bar of Justice: Standing in 
Environmental Suits and the Constitution, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 27, 50–52 (2003) (Philippines, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh); Matt Handley, Comment, Why Crocodiles, Elephants, and American 
Citizens Should Prefer Foreign Courts: A Comparative Analysis of Standing to Sue, 21 REV. LITIG. 
97, 116–33 (2002) (Britain, Italy, Germany, and Brazil).  
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current standing doctrine to environmental claims and concludes that the 
application leads to inadequate environmental outcomes. Finally, Part VII 
proposes using an Article I tribunal to decide environmental claims, and 
Part VIII briefly summarizes the argument.  
II. ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION 
A survey of recent environmental legislation illustrates an increased 
focus on environmental protection.6 The purpose of modern environmental 
law is “to correct market failures and to ensure that an adequate supply of 
public goods, such as clean air and water, is available to the public.”7 
Modern environmental law originated in the 1960s.8 Congress passed 
legislation to prevent pollution and protect habitats, including the Clean 
Air Act,9 the Water Quality Act,10 and the Endangered Species 
Preservation Act.11 A renewed focus on environmental law occurred 
during the 1970s; Congress passed over twenty pieces of new legislation 
in that decade.12 This included the creation of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA),13 and the introduction of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),14 which serves as the foundation for 
modern environmental policy.15 While an overall decrease in federal 
 
 
 6. JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL 
DIMENSIONS 17–32 (Thomson Wadworth 4th ed., 2004) (highlighting important environmental 
legislation, following the development of important environmental groups, and tracking public opinion 
about environmental politics). 
 7. Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 897, 
908 (2006).  
 8. SWITZER, supra note 6, at 18.  
 9. Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). The Clean Air Act of 1963 
“expanded research and technical assistance programs, gave the federal government investigative and 
abatement authority, and encouraged the automobile and petroleum industries to develop exhaust 
control devices.” SWITZER, supra note 6, at 232.  
 10. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965). “In 1965, the Water 
Quality Act established a water quality standard for interstate waters to be met by June 1967 and 
streamlined federal enforcement efforts.” SWITZER, supra note 6, at 213.  
 11. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966). 
“[T]he Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, mandated the secretary of the interior to develop 
a program to conserve, protect, restore, and propagate selected species of native fish and wildlife.” 
SWITZER, supra note 6, at 257.  
 12. See SWITZER, supra note 6, at 19–21.  
 13. For an argument that the EPA is an ineffective way to effectuate environmental policy, see 
DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON: HOW CONGRESS GRABS 
POWER, SHIRKS RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES THE PEOPLE (2005).  
 14. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970). 
 15. SWITZER, supra note 6, at 20. NEPA “require[ed] extensive analysis of the environmental 
impact of proposed projects and the development of ways to minimize negative impacts.” Id. 
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regulation occurred in the 1980s,16 the 1990s saw heightened 
congressional activity,17 as evidenced by the passage of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments18 and the Energy Policy Act.19 A Republican-controlled 
Congress and Democratic executive created gridlock and eventually 
stalled these new legislative efforts.20 Since 2001, a shift occurred that 
created a renewed interest in deregulation.21 Several initiatives instituted 
in the early 1990s have been repealed by the George W. Bush 
administration.22  
Despite increasing legislative protection, the Court has limited the 
effectiveness of congressional environmental policy by preventing 
enforcement of these laws in federal court.23 For example, the Court has 
used standing to bar suits and limit plaintiffs under citizen-suit 
provisions.24 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court utilized the 
standing doctrine to limit citizen suits by requiring a demonstration of 
independent injury.25 The Defenders of Wildlife Court reversed the 
 
 
 16. SWITZER, supra note 6, at 22. 
 17. For a comprehensive treatment of environmental politics in the 1990s, see NORMAN J. VIG & 
MICHAEL E. KRAFT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S (3d ed. 1997).  
 18. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). The Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1990 “established five categories of nonattainment areas . . . and set new 
deadlines by which areas must meet federal ozone standards.” SWITZER, supra note 6, at 235.  
 19. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992). The Energy Policy 
Act of 1992 attempted to decrease U.S. oil dependence and increase use of alternative fuels. SWITZER, 
supra note 6, at 175, 177.  
 20. SWITZER, supra note 6, at 23–28. 
 21. Id. at 28–32.  
 22. Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of “Republican Moment” in Environmental Law, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 999, 1006–09 (2003) (characterizing current environmental law as an outgrowth of 
Republican control of the government).  
 23. In a survey of three decades of Supreme Court opinions, Professor Lazarus concluded that 
the Court’s failure to recognize environmental law as a distinct area typifies “the Supreme Court’s 
apparent apathy or even antipathy towards environmental law.” Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s 
Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 737 (2000). 
See also Jonathan Cannon, Environmentalism and the Supreme Court: A Cultural Analysis, 33 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 365 (2006) (concluding “that the Court’s interpretations [of environmental law] 
have worked both to sanction environmentalism and to contain or even marginalize it”). For a survey 
of the Court’s environmental decisions, see GLEN SUSSMAN, BYRON W. DAYNES & JONATHAN P. 
WEST, AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 236–76 (2002). See also Jack Van Doren, 
Environmental Law and the Regulatory State: Postmodernism Rears Its “Ugly” Head?, 13 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 441 (2005) (describing the Court’s treatment of environmental law as a postmodern 
movement that resists definition); Kristen M. Shults, Comment, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services: A Resounding Victory for Environmentalists, Its Implications on Future 
Justiciability Decisions, and Resolution of Issues on Remand, 89 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1021–25 (2001) 
(summarizing the voting trends of Justices in environmental standing decisions).  
 24. Robert J. June, Note, The Structure of Standing Requirements for Citizen Suits and the Scope 
of Congressional Power, 24 ENVTL. L. 761, 762 (1994).  
 25. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 567 (1992). The citizen-suit provision at issue 
provided that “any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person” who is 
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p 1907 Hodits book pages.doc10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1910 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1907 
 
 
 
 
appellate court’s decision that the provision conferred the right to sue on 
any individual.26 As a result, frequently no one is capable of satisfying 
standing requirements and environmental plaintiffs are thrown out of 
court.  
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STANDING 
A brief survey of the history of standing is necessary to understand the 
context in which environmental standing problems arise. The standing 
doctrine has been broken down into “five different eras.”27  
The first period ranges from the American Revolution until 
approximately 1920.28 Commentators debate whether this period provides 
any support for the current standing doctrine.29 The majority find that no 
separate standing doctrine existed at all.30 However, a recent minority 
argues that current standing doctrine “reflects not only the Framers’ likely 
concept of . . . what courts did, but also their view of the judicial role in 
maintaining the separation of power.”31 Regardless of its origins, the Court 
did not articulate standing requirements until 1920.  
The New Deal encompasses the second period.32 Justices Louis 
Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter created “what we now consider standing 
limits” to insulate New Deal legislation from judicial attack.33 The Court 
held that to establish standing, a plaintiff must have a “legal right—one of 
 
 
alleged to be in violation of provisions of the Clean Air Act. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-604, § 304, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
Since the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress has included citizen-suit provisions in 
environmental statutes. Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, “The Friendship of the People”: 
Citizen Participation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 283–84 (2005). 
 26. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 571–73. 
 27. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizens Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168 (1992). See also 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & 
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.1 (3d ed. 1998) (tracing standing’s 
history from 1920). 
 28. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 170.  
 29. It has been found that “the Framers . . . had little to say specifically about Article III’s ‘case 
and controversy’ requirement.” James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, 
the Injury-in-Fact Rule, and the Framers’ Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 34 (2001).  
 30. See Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 
YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. 
L. REV. 1265, 1274–82 (1961); Sunstein, supra note 27, at 168–79; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor 
of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1394–1410 (1988).  
 31. Leonard & Brant, supra note 29, at 6. See also Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English 
Prerogative Writs: The Original Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001 (1997); Ann Woolhandler 
and Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004). 
 32. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 179.  
 33. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/8
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property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious 
invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.”34  
The third period began with the passage of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) in 1946.35 The APA “was an effort to codify the 
developing body of judge-made standing law.”36 It established three 
categories of individuals who could bring suit: people “suffer[ing] a ‘legal 
wrong’” based in the common law, people whose statutorily created 
interests are violated, and people expressly authorized to bring suit under 
statutes other than the APA.37  
The years from the early 1960s until about 1975 constitute the fourth 
period.38 During this period, the Court moved from the legal interest test to 
an “injury-in-fact test.”39 In Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations v. Camp, the Court adopted a two-part inquiry requiring 
“injury in fact, economic or otherwise”40 and injury “arguably within the 
zone of interests” of the regulatory statute.41 Commentators have argued 
that “[m]ore damage to the intellectual structure of the law of standing can 
be traced to Data Processing than to any other single decision.”42 
Finally, the fifth period is the contemporary formulation of standing.43 
The Court currently recognizes two strands: “prudential standing” and 
“Article III standing.”44 Prudential standing consists of waivable 
“judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.”45 
Article III standing requirements are mandatory46 and consist of three 
elements: injury, causation, and redressability.47 First, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate a “concrete,”48 “distinct and palpable,”49 and “real or 
immediate”50 injury.51 Second, causation requires the injury be “fairly 
 
 
 34. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137–38 (1939).  
 35. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 181.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 181–82. 
 38. Id. at 183. For a summary of standing law during this period, see Kenneth Culp Davis, The 
Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450 (1970). 
 39. Leonard & Brant, supra note 29, at 19.  
 40. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). 
 41. Id. at 153.  
 42. Fletcher, supra note 4, at 229.  
 43. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 193.  
 44. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004).  
 45. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).  
 46. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 
 47. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 48. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (“That injury [in fact], we have emphasized 
repeatedly, must be concrete in both a qualitative and temporal sense.”). 
 49. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501. 
 50. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983). 
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traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.”52 Third, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate that “it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that 
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”53  
IV. STANDING IN ENVIRONENTAL LAWSUITS 
The Supreme Court’s environmental standing jurisprudence can be 
broken down into three periods: the early decisions, the strict application 
of standing requirements, and the countermovement away from that strict 
application.  
A. The Early Decisions  
1. Sierra Club v. Morton 
In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Court denied standing when the Sierra 
Club failed to allege that its members were individually injured by the 
destruction of a portion of Sequoia National Park.54 The Sierra Club 
 
 
 51. The Court sometimes refers to this as the “injury in fact requirement.” Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. at 560. See Lin, supra note 7, at 915–21 (tracing the development of environmental harm as a 
requirement for standing). For an argument that the Court has failed to use the injury requirement to 
sharpen litigation, demonstrating that it is not an Article III requirement, see David M. Driesen, 
Standing for Nothing: the Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 808 (2004). 
 52. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). 
The Court has rarely focused much attention on the causation requirement in environmental suits. 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), provides an illustration of how the Court applies the causation 
requirement. Parents of black children attending public schools brought a class action against the IRS 
alleging that it had failed to deny tax-exempt status to discriminatory private schools. Allen, 468 U.S. 
at 743–44. The Court found that “[t]he line of causation between that conduct and desegregation of 
respondents’ schools is attenuated at best.” Id. at 757. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that forcing 
the IRS to withdraw the exemptions would make an appreciable difference in integration. Id. at 758. 
Compare Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968) (upholding a taxpayer’s standing to challenge 
federal subsidies to parochial schools as violating the First Amendment’s prohibition against 
government establishment of religion), and Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 
(denying standing based on causation and redressability to plaintiffs who challenged an IRS ruling that 
limited the amount of free medical care that charitable hospitals could provide), with Valley Forge 
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 470–71 (1982) 
(denying standing to a taxpayer challenging a federal government grant of surplus property as 
violating the Establishment Clause). 
 Although the Court has not frequently addressed causation in environmental suits, the issue has 
surfaced in the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 438–
43 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petrol. Corp., 95 F.3d 358, 361 (5th Cir. 
1996); Natural Res. Def. Counsel v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 504–05 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 71–73 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
 53. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 182. 
 54. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741, 734–35 (1972). Sierra Club brought suit on behalf 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/8
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argued for standing under the APA55 “as a membership corporation with ‘a 
special interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the 
national parks, game refuges and forests of the country.’”56 The Court 
noted that societal environmental interests deserve judicial protection, but 
it refused to grant standing unless the “party seeking review be himself 
among the injured.”57 The Court repudiated the practice of requiring only 
an “organizational interest in the problem.”58 Finally, the Court reiterated 
its expansive definition of injury, which included “‘aesthetic, 
conservational, and recreational’ as well as economic values.”59  
In dissent, Justice Douglas proposed allowing people with an “intimate 
relation with the inanimate object about to be injured, polluted, or 
otherwise despoiled” to bring suit.60 Additionally, he found that 
 
 
of its members to prevent the destruction of a portion of Sequoia National Park by the construction of 
a highway and ski resort. Id. at 728–29. See also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 
333, 343 (1977) (“An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its 
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect 
are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested 
requires the participation in the lawsuit of the individual members in the lawsuit.”). 
 55. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 109-80, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). Originally the Court limited standing to cases where the plaintiff 
could allege a violation of a legal interest or legal wrong. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 733. Under the 
APA, the Court expanded standing by allowing individuals to bring suit if they could demonstrate that 
an “injury in fact” occurred and that the alleged injury occurred in the “zone of interests” of the 
violated statute. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).  
 The Court has expanded its view of injury in fact. The Court used to focus on economic harm 
caused by agency action. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) (finding 
that the economic harm caused to the plaintiff radio station by increasing the frequency and range of a 
competitor satisfied the injury requirement). In Sierra Club the Court recognized a  
trend of cases arising under the APA and other statutes authorizing judicial review of federal 
agency action . . . toward recognizing that injuries other than economic harm are sufficient to 
bring a person within the meaning of the statutory language, and toward discarding the notion 
that an injury that is widely shared is ipso facto not an injury sufficient to provide the basis 
for judicial review. 
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 738. The Court reaffirmed the necessity of the injury requirement despite 
broadening the categories of injury. Id.  
 56. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 730. 
 57. Id. at 734–35. Justice Stevens reaffirmed this position in his concurring opinion in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). He found that the Court had 
often held that injuries to “the interest that particular individuals may have in observing any species or 
its habitat [are sufficient for standing,] whether those individuals are motivated by esthetic enjoyment, 
an interest in professional research, or an economic interest in preservation of the species.” Id. at 582.  
 58. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court argued 
that if it allowed any special interest organization to bring suit, then nothing would prevent any citizen 
from also bringing suit. Id. at 739–40. See also Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 
F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 1970) (subscribing to a public interest view in environmental suits).  
 59. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc., 397 U.S. at 154 (internal citations omitted).  
 60. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 745 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas supported his 
proposition by pointing to other inanimate objects, such as ships and corporations, that have been 
parties to litigation. Id. at 742. Additionally, Justice Douglas offered examples of a river plaintiff and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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“[c]ontemporary public concern for protecting nature’s ecological 
equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental 
objects.”61  
2. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP) 
The Court applied the principles of Sierra Club v. Morton in SCRAP 
and granted standing.62 SCRAP members63 alleged that increased railroad 
shipping rates would raise recycling costs, thus discouraging the use of 
recycled materials.64 Reducing the use of recycled materials would 
arguably result in the destruction of “natural resources surrounding the 
Washington Metropolitan area”65 which SCRAP members used for 
“recreational (and) aesthetic purposes.”66 The Court admitted this was an 
“attenuated line of causation”67 but found sufficient injury for standing 
purposes.68 The Court rejected the government’s proposed heightened 
 
 
of “[t]hose people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water—whether it be a fisherman, a 
canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger.” Id. at 743.  
 61. Id. at 741–42. Furthermore, allowing an inanimate object to represent itself would insure the 
protection of all the life contained in the object. Id. at 743. 
 62. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 
669, 683–90 (1973). The Court granted standing to an environmental organization that sought to have 
the Interstate Commerce Commission file an environmental impact statement required by NEPA. Id. at 
679, 685. 
 63. Five law students formed SCRAP for the primary purpose of enhancing the quality of the 
environment for its members and all citizens. Id. at 678. 
 64. Id. at 675–76. More specifically, SCRAP “claimed that the rate structure would discourage 
the use of ‘recyclable’ materials, and promote the use of new raw materials that compete with scrap, 
thereby adversely affecting the environment by encouraging unwarranted mining, lumbering, and other 
extractive activities [sic].” Id. at 676. 
 65. Id. at 678. SCRAP members claimed that they suffered economic harm from increased prices 
for finished products, environmental harm from the destruction of recreational areas, bodily harm from 
increased levels of pollution, and further economic harm from increased taxes paid to dispose of 
otherwise recyclable materials. Id.  
 66. Id. at 678. The Interstate Commerce Commission instituted an investigation of the proposed 
rate increase’s probable environmental impact and found that the increase would have little effect on 
the environment. Id. at 676–77. Despite this investigation, the Commission “declined to include a 
formal environmental impact statement because it concluded that its actions will neither actually nor 
potentially significantly affect the quality of the human environment.” Id. at 683 n.11.  
 67. Id. at 688.  
 68. Id. at 689–90. SCRAP claimed “that each of its members ‘suffered economic, recreational 
and aesthetic harm’ directly as a result of the adverse environmental impact of the railroad freight 
structure.” Id. at 678. 
 Justice Douglas reaffirmed his Sierra Club v. Morton position, arguing that plaintiffs should not 
have to prove injury in fact. Id. at 703 (Douglas, J., dissenting). To grant standing, Justice Douglas 
would require a representative of environmental interests to show injury to the environment. Id. He 
argued that “[r]ates fixed so as to encourage vast shipments of litter are, therefore, perhaps the most 
immediate and dramatic illustration of a policy which will encourage protection of the environment 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/8
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injury requirement69 and maintained the minimal requirement of some 
injury.70 Despite the widespread environmental impact, the Court 
distinguished Sierra Club v. Morton based on the plaintiff’s alleged direct 
harm71 and on the breadth of the potential damage.72 
In contrast, Justice White’s dissent argued that SCRAP failed to meet 
standing requirements.73 Specifically, he found that “[t]he allegations here 
do not satisfy the threshold requirement of injury in fact”74 because “the 
alleged injuries are so remote, speculative, and insubstantial in fact that 
they fail to confer standing.”75 Justice White further argued against 
standing by analogizing the SCRAP suit to taxpayer and moral suits which 
are frequently dismissed as generalized grievances.76  
 
 
against several erosive conditions.” Id. at 700–01. Additionally, Justice Douglas presented an 
illustration of the importance of, and procedure for, environmental impact statements as provided in 
NEPA. Id. at 703–22. 
 Justice Blackmun’s concurrence adopted a position similar to Justice Douglas’s. Id. at 699 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). He “would require only that appellees, as responsible and sincere 
representatives of environmental interests, show that the environment would be injured in fact and that 
such injury would be irreparable and substantial.” Id. 
 69. The government argued for the Court “to limit standing to those who have been 
‘significantly’ affected by agency action.” Id. at 689 n.14 (majority opinion).  
 70. Id. The Court noted that in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), it “allowed important 
interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs with no more at stake in the outcome of an action than a fraction 
of a vote.” SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689 n.14. 
 Lower courts have found that plaintiffs who have merely an “intellectual curiosity about the 
outcome” alone may not meet standing requirements. See Montgomery Envtl. Coal. v. Costle, 646 
F.2d 568, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Although, if plaintiffs smell, watch, or listen to the potentially affected 
area, they meet the injury requirement. Id. at 578. See also Comm. for Auto Responsibility (C.A.R.) v. 
Solomon, 603 F.2d 992, 998–99 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding that “[h]arm to health and conservational 
interests of parties seeking judicial review is enough to meet the injury-in-fact test for standing” when 
an organization challenged the failure of the government to file an environmental impact statement 
when leasing a parking area).  
 71. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687–88. The Court reiterated its expansion of the injury requirement 
beyond economic harm and found that SCRAP members met the broader requirement of harm to 
“[a]esthetic and environmental well-being.” Id. at 686–87.  
 72. Id. at 687–88. The Court focused on the vast potential impact, and it did not expound on its 
reasons for differentiating between the national impact in SCRAP and the localized interests in Sierra 
Club. Id. at 687–88. 
 73. Id. at 721 (White, J., dissenting).  
 74. Id. at 722. 
 75. Id. at 723. 
 76. Id. In both Sierra Club and SCRAP, the Court distinguished environmental claims from 
generalized grievances. In both cases the Court made clear that “standing is not to be denied simply 
because many people suffer the same injury.” Id. at 687 (majority opinion). The Court found that the 
potential impact of finding a generalized grievance would “deny standing to persons who are in fact 
injured simply because many others are also injured.” Id. at 688. The Court concluded that this “would 
mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody.” Id.  
 Defendants still often make generalized grievance claims when arguing for dismissal. See, e.g., 
Cantrell v. Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 679–82 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that plaintiffs asserted a 
sufficient injury, and not a mere public interest, when they challenged the adequacy of an 
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Sierra Club v. Morton held that injury exists if environmental 
organizations can show direct harm to members.77 The Court’s application 
of this doctrine in SCRAP presented the outer limits of the Court’s 
environmental standing jurisprudence.78 Despite this expansion, Justice 
Douglas’s proposal in Sierra Club v. Morton for environmental object 
suits,79 and Justice White’s skepticism in SCRAP,80 foreshadowed the 
Court’s subsequent divergent views of standing. 
B. Strict Application 
Justice Scalia adopted Justice White’s restrictive view of 
environmental standing, and there is a correlation between his addition to 
the Court and the movement toward strictly applying standing 
requirements. After joining the Court, Justice Scalia authored most of the 
environmental standing opinions.81 Before this, however, he outlined his 
ideas on standing in a 1983 law review article82 and implemented those 
views in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.83  
 
 
environmental impact statement for a redevelopment project).  
 77. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972).  
 78. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 159 (1990). 
 79. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 80. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 
669, 722–24 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).  
 81. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).  
 82. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of Separation of Powers, 
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). 
 83. Commentators have defended and attacked Justice Scalia’s standing views. See, e.g., Gene R. 
Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 1142–43 (1993) 
(repudiating Justice Scalia’s view of standing as conflicting with “the language and history of Article 
III, with the injury requirement itself, with more modest visions of judicial power, and with time-
honored notions of public law litigation”); Michael J. Wray, Still Standing? Citizen Suits, Justice 
Scalia’s New Theory of Standing and the Decision in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment, 8 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 207, 244 (2000) (finding that Justice Scalia’s view “will reduce the 
number of citizen suits prosecuted and will diminish the citizen plaintiff’s effectiveness in compelling 
compliance with federal environmental law”); Kimberly M. Large, Comment, The Mischaracterization 
of Justice Scalia as Environmental Foe: What Harm to Standing Following the Court’s Stance in 
Laidlaw Environmental v. Friends of the Earth?, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 561, 575–83 (2004) (arguing 
that Justice Scalia’s view protects the environment by freeing resources for environmental protection 
instead of litigation).  
 Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts’s article defending Justice Scalia’s view has already created 
scholarly debate. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219 
(1993); see also Paul Alexander Fortenberry and Daniel Canton Beck, Chief Justice Roberts—
Constitutional Interpretations of Article III and the Commerce Clause: Will the “Hapless Toad” and 
“John Q. Public” Have Any Protection in the Roberts Court?, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 55 (2005).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/8
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1. Justice Scalia’s Law Review Article 
Justice Scalia outlined his strict standing framework in a 1983 Suffolk 
University Law Review article.84 He emphasized a more stringent injury 
requirement and stressed the role of separation of powers in the standing 
doctrine. First, Justice Scalia argued “that courts need to accord greater 
weight than they have in recent times to the traditional requirement that 
the plaintiff’s alleged injury be a particularized one, which sets him apart 
from the citizenry at large.”85 Second, he argued that a relaxed view of 
injury had created “an overjudicialization of the processes of self-
governance.”86 The Court should use standing to effectuate separation of 
powers and to prevent this overjudicialization.87 According to Scalia, “the 
law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic 
role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the 
majority.”88 Additionally, Justice Scalia found that standing “excludes 
[courts] from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the 
other two branches should function in order to serve the interest of the 
majority itself.”89 Therefore, the legislature cannot create a “concrete 
injury so widely shared . . . to mark out a subgroup of the body politic 
requiring judicial protection.”90 Justice Scalia implemented these ideas in 
Defenders of Wildlife.  
2. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 
In Defenders of Wildlife the Court held that the Defenders of Wildlife 
(“Defenders”) lacked standing to challenge regulations promulgated under 
 
 
 84. Scalia, supra note 82, at 881. 
 85. Id. at 881–82. Professor Ann Carlson argued that a stricter injury in fact requirement benefits 
environmental litigants because it focuses on human impact as opposed to environmental harm. Ann E. 
Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 931, 955–63 (1998).  
 86. Scalia, supra note 82, at 881.  
 87. Cf. Leonard & Brant, supra note 29, at 39. In addition to cases of a judicial nature, the 
Framers believed there were further limits on the types of cases that federal courts could hear. Id. 
Despite the Framers articulating a need to confine federal court jurisdiction to cases of a judicial 
nature, “the Constitution’s structure tolerates a significant level of interaction among the branches and 
does not confine each branch to a strict category of permitted functions.” Id. at 49.  
 88. Scalia, supra note 82, at 894. Professor John Echeverria argued that focusing on “minority” 
interests in environmental suits expands the power of big businesses and cripples environmental 
advocates. John D. Echeverria, Critiquing Laidlaw: Congressional Power to Confer Standing and the 
Irrelevance of Mootness Doctrine to Civil Penalties, 11 Duke ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 287, 290–91 
(2001).  
 89. Scalia, supra note 82, at 894.  
 90. Id. at 895–96. 
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the Endangered Species Act (ESA).91 Defenders claimed that a federal 
regulation exempting foreign projects from consultation with the Secretary 
of the Interior violated the ESA.92 Defenders members traveled to view the 
Nile crocodile in Egypt and the Asian elephant and Asian leopard in Sri 
Lanka.93 Although the members did not observe the endangered species, 
they claimed a desire to return and potentially see the animals at a later 
date.94 Defenders alleged that U.S. support of development projects in 
these nations would endanger the animals’ habitats, shorten the future of 
these species, and prevent Defenders members from viewing the 
animals.95  
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia articulated a three-part 
constitutional standing test that reflected ideas from his law review article. 
First, “the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”96 Furthermore, a 
particularized injury is an injury that “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal 
and individual way.”97 Second, “there must be a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be 
 
 
 91. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992). Defenders of Wildlife renewed the 
debate about environmental standing. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: 
Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170 (1993) (arguing that 
the Constitution gives Congress greater power to grant standing than the restricted approach of 
Defenders of Wildlife, that the reasoning in Defenders of Wildlife is not applicable as a broad standing 
rule, and that the opinions in Defenders of Wildlife are amorphous).  
 92. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 558–59. The specific provision of the ESA reads:  
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, 
insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result 
in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by 
the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical, unless such 
agency has been granted an exemption for such action by the Committee pursuant to 
subsection (h) of this section. 
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). The original regulation extended the actions required by § 1536(a)(2) 
to foreign nations. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1979). The proposed changes eliminated the consultation 
requirement for foreign nations and only required consultation for actions taken in the United States or 
on the high seas. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1991). 
 93. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 563.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 563–64. Defenders pointed to the United States’ oversight of the Aswan High Dam 
rehabilitation in Egypt and to the Agency for International Development’s funding of the Mahaweli 
project in Sri Lanka. Id.  
 96. Id. at 560 (internal quotations omitted). Justice Scalia cites numerous cases that highlight the 
evolution of the injury requirement. Id. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–41 n.16 (1972).  
 97. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1. To be affected in a personal way, the organization 
must show direct effects on its members and more than an “injury to a cognizable interest.” Id. at 563.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/8
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‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . 
th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the 
court.’”98 Third, “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ 
that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”99 
Applying this test, Justice Scalia found that Defenders failed to 
establish an imminent injury because its members lacked a return plan.100 
Justice Scalia also rejected Defenders’ argument that the ESA’s citizen-
suit provision waived the specific injury requirement.101 Finally, Justice 
Scalia, writing for the Court, rejected Defenders’ ecosystem nexus, animal 
nexus, and vocational nexus theories.102  
Justice Scalia only gained a plurality of the Court for his conclusion 
that Defenders failed to meet the redressability requirement.103 For 
standing to exist, Justice Scalia required that a favorable decision likely 
 
 
 98. Id. at 560 (citations omitted).  
 99. Id. at 561 (citations omitted).  
 100. Id. at 564. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence found that it was not unreasonable to require return 
airline tickets to demonstrate an imminent injury. Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Scalia 
goes on to explain that “[a]lthough ‘imminence’ is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot 
be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for 
Article III purposes.” Id. at 565 n.2 (majority opinion). Justice Blackmun’s dissent argued that the 
requirement of concrete return visit plans is a mere formality. Id. at 593 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
Justice Blackmun found that “the Court’s demand for detailed descriptions of future conduct will do 
little to weed out those who are genuinely harmed from those who are not.” Id.  
 101. Id. at 571–78 (majority opinion). The Court’s logic is difficult to follow, but it seems to hinge 
upon a generalized grievance argument. The plaintiff alleged that it suffered a procedural injury by the 
Secretary’s failure to follow consultation procedures. Id. at 572. Justice Scalia found this argument 
unique because there was no underlying concrete interest that the failure to follow the procedure would 
violate. Id. at 572–73. If the Court allowed all citizens to bring suit to compel the executive to enforce 
the law, plaintiffs could circumvent the case or controversy requirement. Id. at 573–74. Justice Scalia 
supported this proposition by referencing the Court’s limitations on taxpayer suits. Id. at 574–76.  
 In contrast, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence suggested that Congress “has the power to define 
injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none 
existed before.” Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Congress’s power to grant standing is limited by 
its ability to “identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons 
entitled to bring suit.” Id. If Congress uses “citizen suits to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest 
in the proper administration of the laws,” it oversteps the outer limit of its ability to confer Article III 
standing. Id. at 580–81. 
 102. Id. at 565–68 (majority opinion). The “ecosystem nexus” theory proposed granting standing 
to “any person who uses any part of a ‘contiguous ecosystem’ adversely affected by a funded activity 
. . . even if the activity is located a great distance away.” Id. at 565. The “animal nexus” theory sought 
to grant standing to “anyone who has an interest in studying or seeing the endangered animals 
anywhere on the globe.” Id. at 566; cf. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 
231 n.4 (1986) (noting that a person who worked with or observed a particular species could allege 
sufficient facts to satisfy the injury requirement). Finally, the “vocational nexus” theory sought to 
grant standing to “anyone with a professional interest in such animals.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. at 566.  
 103. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 568–72.  
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redress the alleged harm.104 He found it “entirely conjectural” that 
requiring the Secretary to change a regulation would affect the species at 
the specific projects Defenders members visited.105 Additionally, Justice 
Scalia stated that Defenders failed to demonstrate that withdrawing agency 
funding would affect the specific projects because the agency only 
provided a fraction of the funds.106  
C. The Countermovement Away From Strict Application 
The Court moved away from a strict application of Article III standing 
requirements in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services.107  
In Laidlaw, the Court found that Friends of the Earth satisfied standing 
requirements.108 Laidlaw had violated the limits of a treated-water-
discharge permit and polluted the North Tyger River.109 Friends of the 
Earth members alleged that they stopped using the river for recreational 
purposes because it smelled and looked polluted.110 Friends of the Earth 
brought suit under the Clean Water Act’s (CWA’s) citizen-suit 
provision.111  
 
 
 104. Id. at 561. 
 105. Id. at 571. The Court would require plaintiffs to name the agencies funding the projects as 
defendants; therefore, a favorable decision would stop funding for the specific projects mentioned. Id. 
at 568. See also Glover River Org. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 675 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1982) (finding 
that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the listing of the leopard darter as an endangered species 
when the plaintiff’s requested relief was the preparation of an environmental impact statement and 
when the plaintiff failed to list the specific projects that threatened the leopard darter). 
 106. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 571.  
 107. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). Like 
Defenders of Wildlife, Laidlaw also sparked an academic debate. See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 88 
(exploring whether Article III limits federal court cases to the enforcement of federal rights and 
arguing that a case is not moot when a defendant complies with the law after the suit commences); 
Shults, supra note 23 (tracing the evolution of the Court’s standing doctrine, contrasting the views 
presented in Laidlaw and Defenders of Wildlife, and summarizing the positions taken by the justices in 
environmental cases).  
 108. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184, 186.  
 109. Id. at 176. The permit limited the discharge of pollutants, regulated effluent from the facility, 
and imposed reporting obligations. Id. Laidlaw repeatedly discharged mercury into the North Tyger 
River in excess of the allowable daily average. Id.  
 110. Id. at 181–83. Friends of the Earth members stopped fishing, camping, swimming, 
picnicking, walking, bird-watching, wading, hiking, boating, driving, and canoeing in or around the 
river because of concern about discharged pollutants. Id. 
 111. Id. at 176. The CWA requires that a citizen-suit plaintiff provide notice to the EPA, the state 
in which the alleged violation occurred, and the alleged violator sixty days before initiating suit. 33 
U.S.C. § 1365(a), (b) (2006). The CWA prevents the citizen suit from continuing if the EPA or the 
state where the alleged violation occurred commences suit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2006). Friends 
of the Earth notified Laidlaw of its intent to file suit; Laidlaw then requested that the South Carolina 
Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) file suit. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 176–77. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/8
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First, the Court found a sufficient injury.112 The Court emphasized that 
“the relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is not injury 
to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”113 The Court also concluded 
that Friends of the Earth alleged specific114 and definite harm to future 
river use.115 Finally, the Court found that Friends of the Earth’s argument 
comported with its holding in Los Angeles v. Lyons that a plaintiff seeking 
injunctive relief must show a “real or immediate threat that the plaintiff 
will be wronged again.”116 In Laidlaw, the Court found “nothing 
‘improbable’ about the proposition that a company’s continuous and 
pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river would cause nearby 
residents to curtail their recreational use of the waterway and would 
subject them to other economic and aesthetic harms.”117 
Second, the Court found that the deterrent effect of civil penalties 
satisfied the redressability requirement.118 The Court held that “[t]o the 
extent that [civil penalties] encourage defendants to discontinue current 
violations and deter them from committing future ones, they afford redress 
 
 
DHEC and Laidlaw reached a settlement and Friends of the Earth subsequently filed. Id. at 177. 
 112. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 176–77.  
 113. Id. at 181. The Court found that requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate injury to the 
environment would “raise the standing hurdle higher than the necessary showing for success on the 
merits.” Id. By requiring a demonstration of harm to the plaintiff, the Court limited the standing 
inquiry. Under the dissent’s view, a plaintiff would have to demonstrate both personal injury and 
environmental injury. Id. at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In contrast, Justice Douglas’s proposal for 
environmental object suits would only require a demonstration of injury to the environment, as 
plaintiff, and not injury to an individual. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting).  
 114. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 169 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)). 
The Court distinguished National Wildlife Federation because Laidlaw’s actions “directly affected 
those affiants’ recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests.” Id. at 184. In National Wildlife 
Federation, an environmental organization challenged the Bureau of Land Management’s land 
withdrawal review program, alleging “that the reclassification of some withdrawn lands and the return 
of others to the public domain would open the lands up to mining activities, thereby destroying their 
natural beauty.” Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 879 (1990). 
 115. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184. The Court found that Friends of the Earth’s affidavits, which stated 
that members stopped using the affected waterway for fear of pollution, alleged a sufficient injury. Id. 
at 181–82. The Court reasoned that Friends of the Earth members “adequately allege injury in fact 
when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational 
values of the area will be lessened’ by the challenged activity.” Id. at 183. The Court contrasted the 
plaintiff members’ desire to use the river to Defenders members’ speculative plans to return to Egypt 
and Sri Lanka. Id.  
 116. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). Subsequently, “the Supreme Court has 
reaffirmed that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show a likelihood of future injury.” ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3 (4th ed. 2003). In Lyons, a victim of the Los Angeles 
Police Department’s chokehold policy attempted to enjoin the procedure. The Court held that the 
victim failed to meet the injury requirement. Id. 
 117. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184. 
 118. Id. at 185. 
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to citizen plaintiffs who are injured or threatened with injury.”119 In this 
case, civil penalties likely would redress Friends of the Earth members’ 
injuries and alter Laidlaw’s behavior.120 Finally, the Court found 
inapplicable Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment’s holding 
that suing “to assess penalties for wholly past violations” does not provide 
redress.121  
Justice Scalia’s dissent argued that Friends of the Earth failed to meet 
the injury and redressability requirements.122 Justice Scalia argued that 
Friends of the Earth failed to demonstrate a concrete and particularized 
injury.123 He pointed to affidavits which express “concern” about pollution 
and “belief” of excess mercury levels, as opposed to actual facts related to 
environmental degradation.124 He reiterated Defenders of Wildlife’s focus 
on injury to the plaintiff, but he argued that it is nearly impossible to 
demonstrate a personalized injury without first establishing an 
environmental injury.125 Justice Scalia concluded that the majority “makes 
the injury-in-fact requirement a sham” by granting standing based on 
beliefs and concerns.126  
 
 
 119. Id. at 186. The Court noted that the purpose of civil penalties is to promote immediate 
compliance and deter future violations. Id. at 185. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the 
availability, as opposed to the imposition, of civil penalties is sufficient. Id. at 186. The Court also 
explained that the availability of civil penalties only had value if they could be carried out and that 
civil penalties typically bring about deterrence. Id. The Court admitted that sometimes civil penalties 
may be so insubstantial and remote that they do not have a deterrent effect. Id. at 187. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 187–88. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), the 
Court held that Citizens for a Better Environment failed to meet the redressability requirement because 
none of the plaintiff members’ request for relief would “serve to reimburse respondent for losses 
caused by the late reporting.” Id. at 105–06. The plaintiff filed suit to obtain information about the 
storage and release of toxic chemicals. Id. at 104. In a variety of other contexts, the Court has granted 
standing when the plaintiff can show an injury from being deprived information that is promised by 
federal statute. Compare FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998) (finding that a violation of a federal 
statute that created a right to information was sufficient to establish injury in fact), with United States 
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179–80 (1974) (holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to information 
about the CIA’s budget because his case presented a generalized grievance, despite the Constitution 
providing for a regular statement and accounting). The Court in Steel Co. found “[n]othing supports 
the requested injunctive relief except respondent’s generalized interest in deterrence, which is 
insufficient for purposes of Article III.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 108–09. 
 122. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 198–99, 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. at 198.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. Justice Scalia noted that environmental plaintiffs under the CWA typically first 
demonstrate harm to the environment, and then plaintiffs show that the harm to the environment 
impacts them. Id. at 199. 
 126. Id. at 201. Justice Scalia would require “evidence supporting the affidavits’ bald assertions 
regarding decreasing recreational usage and declining home values, as well as evidence for the 
improbable proposition that Laidlaw’s violations, even though harmless to the environment, are 
somehow responsible for these effects.” Id. at 200. 
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In addition, Justice Scalia found that the majority’s interpretation of 
redressability “has grave implications for democratic governance.”127 He 
found that the analysis failed to provide “relief specifically tailored to the 
plaintiff’s injury.”128 Specifically, Friends of the Earth’s “remedy is a 
statutorily specified ‘penalty’ for past violations, payable entirely to the 
United States Treasury.”129 Justice Scalia’s argument focused on three 
main points.130 First, he found Friends of the Earth presented a generalized 
grievance which “convert[ed] an ‘undifferentiated public interest’ into an 
‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts.”131 As evidence, Justice Scalia 
cited Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,132 where the Court required a direct 
relationship “between the alleged injury and the claim sought to be 
adjudicated.”133 Second, he found potential civil penalties too 
speculative.134 The possible imposition of a civil penalty created “fear of a 
penalty for future pollution,” but did not guarantee behavior change.135 
Third, Justice Scalia found that the CWA’s citizen-suit provision violated 
separation of powers.136 Congress had usurped the executive’s 
enforcement power by allowing private citizens to bring suit for CWA 
violations.137 
V. HISTORY OF ARTICLE I TRIBUNALS AND PUBLIC RIGHTS 
Like the Court’s standing jurisprudence, the Court’s treatment of 
Article I tribunals has fluctuated over time. Congress has created a variety 
of Article I tribunals. For example, Congress has established territorial 
 
 
 127. Id. at 202.  
 128. Id. at 204. But cf. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft 
Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1991) (finding that a change in airport standards was a personal injury 
fairly traceable to a congressional board).  
 129. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 205.  
 132. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
 133. Id. at 618. The mother of an illegitimate child sought to require the state to enforce a child 
support statute against her child’s father, which the state only enforced for legitimate children. Id. The 
Court held that potential future child support payments failed to establish redressability because it was 
speculative whether the father would pay. Id.  
 134. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 205–09. 
 135. Id. at 208.  
 136. Id. at 209–10.  
 137. Id. The citizen-suit provision allowed plaintiffs to set the enforcement agenda by acting “as a 
self-appointed mini-EPA.” Id. at 209. Justice Scalia rejected the argument that permitting the EPA or 
comparable state agencies to intervene allowed the executive to set the enforcement agenda. Id. at 210. 
He noted that even though the executive is allowed to intervene, the private citizen still chooses the 
target. Id. at 209–10.  
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courts, consular courts, courts in unincorporated districts outside the 
United States, military courts, private land claims courts, Indian 
citizenship courts, the District of Columbia courts, the Tax Court, and the 
Court of Claims.138 The Court’s jurisprudence on Article I tribunals and 
public rights, however, has vacillated significantly. Decisions from three 
distinct time periods highlight these differences.139 First, in Murray’s 
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., the Court began delimiting 
the role of Article I tribunals for public rights cases.140 Second, Crowell v. 
Benson expanded the notion of public rights to aide the creation of the 
administrative state.141 Third, the Court’s modern interpretation of Article 
I tribunals and public rights evolved in Northern Pipeline Construction 
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,142 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural 
Products Co.,143 and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.144  
A. The Foundations of Using Article I Tribunals for Public Rights 
Disputes 
In Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., the Court 
suggested that Congress can choose to assign public rights cases to the 
judiciary or non–Article III tribunals.145 In this case, treasury officials 
audited and issued a distress warrant against a collector whose accounts 
were in arrears.146 The collector challenged the officials’ actions as a 
violation of Article III; he alleged that the treasury officials were 
exercising judicial power.147 The Court concluded that the treasury 
 
 
 138. Maryellen Fullerton, No Light at the End of the Pipeline: Confusion Surrounds Legislative 
Courts, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 207, 215 n.44 (1983). For a summary of the history of each of these 
tribunals see David A. Case, Article I Courts, Substantive Rights, and Remedies for Government 
Misconduct, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 101, 145–85 (2005).  
 139. Numerous commentators have advocated for a shift in the theoretical framework of 
legislative courts. See Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the 
Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 226–28 (1983) (arguing for a return to a more 
textual reading of Article III); Craig A. Stern, What’s a Constitution Among Friends?—Unbalancing 
Article III, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1043 (abandoning the balancing test and looking to the Constitution for 
support of the public rights exception).  
 140. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855). 
 141. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932). For a summary of early cases discussing Article I 
tribunals, see Wilber Griffith Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARV. L. REV. 894 (1930). 
 142. N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).  
 143. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). 
 144. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 145. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284. 
 146. Id. at 275. 
 147. Id.  
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officials did not exercise judicial power, and therefore their actions were 
constitutional.148  
First, according to the Court, enumerated legislative powers include the 
collection of state funds.149 The Court listed legislative powers as “the 
powers ‘to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the 
debts, and provide for the common defense and welfare of the United 
States, to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy.’”150 
Additionally, Congress’s power “includes all known and appropriate 
means” of effectuating the enumerated legislative purposes.151  
Second, the Court found that although Congress can assign tasks to the 
judiciary, this assignment alone fails to create a judicial controversy.152 In 
attempting to differentiate a judicial controversy from a congressionally 
assigned task, the Court explained that: 
there are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented 
in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, 
and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which 
congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts 
of the United States, as it may deem proper.153 
Therefore, Congress has the discretion to assign certain public rights 
controversies to Article III courts or Article I tribunals.  
B. The Court Affirms the Use of Article I Tribunals for Public Rights 
Disputes 
In Crowell v. Benson, the Court reaffirmed the public/private 
distinction in Murray’s Lessee and allowed initial determinations in 
administrative agencies for private law matters.154 The case arose when J. 
B. Knudsen suffered injuries while working on a barge owned by his 
employer, Charles Benson.155 Knudsen brought suit against Benson under 
the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act 
(“Longshoremen’s Act”).156 The Longshoremen’s Act provided for initial 
 
 
 148. Id. at 281. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 284. 
 154. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932). 
 155. Crowell v. Benson, 45 F.2d 66, 66 (5th Cir. 1930), aff’d, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).  
 156. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 36.  
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determination of claims by the United States Employees’ Compensation 
Commission and for review of those decisions by injunction in federal 
district courts.157 Letus Crowell, a Deputy Commissioner of the United 
States Employees’ Compensation Commission, found in favor of 
Knudsen, and Benson brought suit in federal district court to enjoin the 
award.158 The Supreme Court held that the Longshoremen’s Act’s 
procedure did not violate due process because federal courts could suspend 
or set aside the Commission’s order.159  
In concluding that Knudsen and Benson’s controversy dealt with 
private rights, the Court reiterated the public and private rights distinction 
in Murray’s Lessee.160 The Court found this distinction “at once 
apparent.”161 In exercising its powers, Congress can create Article I 
tribunals to determine matters between the government and private 
individuals, or it may delegate that power to executive officers or the 
judiciary.162 Additionally, for disputes involving private rights, the Court 
refused to create a requirement that “all determinations of fact in 
constitutional courts shall be made by judges.”163  
C. An Oscillating Theoretical Framework for Article I Tribunals 
1. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., a 
plurality of the Court prohibited expansive use of Article I tribunals.164 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 (“Bankruptcy Act”) created bankruptcy 
courts that served as adjuncts to federal district courts and that had 
expansive jurisdiction over all civil proceedings arising under or related to 
bankruptcy proceedings.165 After concluding that bankruptcy judges are 
not Article III judges,166 the plurality found that Article I tribunals are 
limited to three historical exceptions: territorial courts, military tribunals, 
and public rights cases.167 In its discussion of public rights cases, the 
 
 
 157. Id. at 43–44. 
 158. Id. at 37. 
 159. Id. at 45. 
 160. Id. at 50–51. 
 161. Id. at 50. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 51. 
 164. N. Pipeline Coast. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83–84 (1982). 
 165. Id. at 53. 
 166. Id. at 60. 
 167. Id. at 63–70. 
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Justices found that “[t]he distinction between public rights and private 
rights has not been definitively explained in our precedents.”168 
Additionally, the Justices recognized that the public rights exception is 
based on separation of powers principles and sovereign immunity.169 The 
plurality concluded that “[p]rivate-rights disputes . . . lie at the core of the 
historically recognized judicial power” and that public rights cases must 
involve a dispute between private individuals and the government.170 The 
Justices distinguished the federal bankruptcy power, which could be a 
public right, from state-created private rights.171  
Additionally, the plurality articulated limits on Congress’s ability to 
create adjunct Article I tribunals.172 When Congress creates substantive 
rights, “it possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which 
that right may be adjudicated—including the assignment to an adjunct of 
some functions historically performed by judges.”173 However, Congress 
must limit an Article I tribunal’s functions to ensure that the essential 
attributes of judicial power are retained in Article III courts.174 In its final 
analysis, the plurality concluded that Article III prevented Congress from 
giving Article I tribunals complete power over “all matters related to those 
arising under the bankruptcy laws.”175  
In dissent, Justice White rejected the plurality’s oversimplification of 
the history of Article I tribunals and advocated for a balancing test.176 
Justice White traced the “complicated and contradictory” history of Article 
I tribunals and concluded that the Court has not articulated a workable 
standard to evaluate the constitutionality of these tribunals.177 He proposed 
that Article III values should be “balanced against competing 
constitutional values and legislative responsibilities.”178 Two factors 
weigh in favor of the constitutionality of Article I tribunals: review of the 
tribunal’s decisions by Article III courts and congressional delegation of 
issues that are of little interest to the political branches.179  
 
 
 168. Id. at 69. 
 169. Id. at 67.  
 170. Id. at 70. 
 171. Id. at 71. 
 172. Id. at 80–81. 
 173. Id. at 80. 
 174. Id. at 81. 
 175. Id. at 76. 
 176. Id. at 103–16 (White, J., dissenting). 
 177. Id. at 113. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 115. 
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2. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. 
Three years later, in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products 
Co., the Court limited the Northern Pipeline plurality’s strict reading and 
advocated for a more functional approach to evaluating the 
constitutionality of Article I tribunals.180 The Court held that Article III 
allows Congress to require binding arbitration for disputes under the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.181 The Court 
reasoned that it “has long recognized that Congress is not barred from 
acting pursuant to its powers under Article I to vest decisionmaking 
authority in tribunals that lack the attributes of Article III courts.”182 
Furthermore, the Court narrowly construed Northern Pipeline’s plurality 
opinion183 and found permissible the use of Article I tribunals for private 
rights disputes closely related to governmental regulatory activities.184 The 
Court no longer required the federal government to be a litigant and 
rejected strict adherence to the formal historical categories used in 
Northern Pipeline.185  
3. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor 
Finally, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor the Court 
adopted a multi-factor balancing test to analyze the constitutionality of 
Article I tribunals.186 William Schor brought a claim for reparations in the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).187 The CFTC’s 
jurisdiction permitted it to hear state law counterclaims arising out of the 
transaction that precipitated the reparations claim.188 In upholding the 
CFTC’s ability to hear counterclaims, the Court concluded that the 
CFTC’s jurisdiction did not violate Article III.189  
Adopting the framework from Justice White’s dissent in Northern 
Pipeline, the Court found that “the constitutionality of a given 
congressional delegation of adjudicative functions to a non–Article III 
body must be assessed by reference to the purposes underlying the 
 
 
 180. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584–85 (1985). 
 181. Id. at 571. 
 182. Id. at 583. 
 183. Id. at 584. 
 184. Id. at 594. 
 185. Id. at 586–87. 
 186. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986). 
 187. Id. at 837. 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. at 857. 
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requirements of Article III.”190 The Court confessed that its precedents “do 
not admit easy synthesis,” but stated that conclusory references to Article 
III are not enough.191 The Court focused on the importance of separation 
of powers and enumerated a number of factors to consider when analyzing 
non–Article III bodies.192 These factors include:  
the extent to which the “essential attributes of judicial power” are 
reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which 
the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and 
powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and 
importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that 
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.193  
The Court found that the distinction between public and private rights 
is a consideration, but it should not be given “talismanic power.”194 The 
Court concluded that “due regard must be given in each case to the unique 
aspects of the congressional plan at issue and its practical consequences in 
light of the larger concerns that underlie Article III.”195  
VI. ANALYSIS 
A. The Court’s Current Standing Test Compromises Environmental 
Protection 
The Court’s amorphous application of Article III standing 
compromises environmental protection. Although the Court has settled on 
the requirements, its refusal to adequately define injury, causation, and 
redressability empowers federal courts to inconsistently apply the standing 
doctrine. Additionally, the Court’s standing decisions typically turn on 
case specific facts, thus creating sporadic environmental decisions. 
1. The Injury Requirement Lacks a Coherent Formulation and 
Foundation  
The Court applies the injury requirement inconsistently, finding some 
harm concrete, distinct, palpable, actual, or imminent, while finding other 
 
 
 190. Id. at 847. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 850–51. 
 193. Id. at 851. 
 194. Id. at 853–54. 
 195. Id. at 857. 
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harm merely speculative.196 SCRAP, Defenders of Wildlife, and Laidlaw 
demonstrate the Court’s inconsistency when applying the injury 
requirement to environmental cases. The effect of increased railroad rates 
on SCRAP members’ recreational uses of the natural environment was a 
sufficient injury,197 but Defenders members’ plans to return to study 
endangered species was deemed speculative.198 Additionally, proximity to 
harm, regardless of the plaintiff’s actual use of the affected area, seems to 
guarantee a concrete injury.199 The Court’s attempts to define the injury 
requirement are “as if the Justices were trying to get their arms around the 
mist.”200 
Second, the injury in fact requirement lacks a constitutional basis and 
allows judges to bar court access based on their own ideologies. Injury in 
fact “first arose in a 1958 treatise by Kenneth Culp Davis, purporting to 
interpret the Administrative Procedure Act[’s] . . . ‘adversely affected or 
aggrieved’ language.”201 Professor Davis’s creation of the injury in fact 
requirement prevents anchoring injury analysis in precedent. It has aided 
inconsistent application. Additionally, the injury in fact requirement 
allows judges to use a “standard that is normatively laden and independent 
of facts.”202 Professor William Fletcher argues “that anyone who claims to 
be injured is, in fact, injured if she can prove the allegations of her 
complaint.”203 He provides the example of a parent buying a bicycle for 
one child but not the other.204 The bicycle-less child feels hurt regardless 
 
 
 196. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. 
REV. 301, 308 (2002) (finding that “[s]eemingly obvious injuries have been rejected as abstract or 
idiosyncratic”); cf. Roberts, supra note 83, at 1223 (arguing that the Court’s current standing 
requirements are of “the sort common to the lawyer’s craft”).  
 197. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 
669, 678 (1973).  
 198. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 567 (1992).  
 199. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 685. In Laidlaw, the Court found a sufficient injury despite several 
members of Friends of the Earth not using the river since childhood. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 198 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 200. Nichol, supra note 196, at 320. Additionally, the Court’s formulation of the injury 
requirement makes it difficult to address concerns like global warming. See Bradford C. Mank, 
Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1 (2005); Blake R. 
Bertagna, Comment, “Standing” Up for the Environment: The Ability of Plaintiffs to Establish Legal 
Standing to Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 BYU L. REV. 415 (2006); Brian 
Mayer, Note, Climate Change, Insurance, NEPA, and Article III: Does a Policy Holder Have Standing 
to Sue a Federal Agency for Failure to Address Climate Change Under NEPA?, 74 UMKC L. REV. 
435, 447–53 (2005).  
 201. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 185.  
 202. Id. at 188–89.  
 203. Fletcher, supra note 4, at 232.  
 204. Id. 
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of if the parent thinks that the feeling is justified.205 Similarly, plaintiffs 
are injured if they can demonstrate the facts that led to them feeling hurt. 
When judges decide whether the feelings are justified, their normative 
decision defines the injury. The correlation between a judge’s political 
party and the likelihood of granting standing evinces this normative 
judgment.206 The judge’s choice between the labels “actual and imminent” 
or “speculative and abstract” is inherently value-laden.  
2. Causation and Redressability are Easily Manipulable 
Like the injury requirement, causation and redressability are 
“[e]xtremely fuzzy and highly manipulable.”207 The cases dealing with 
causation and redressability “are usually so dependent on their particular 
facts that they provide little general guidance.”208 It is difficult to see why 
stopping a rate increase established a causation chain and adequately 
redressed SCRAP members’ recreational injuries, 209 but pulling funding 
for a project failed to redress Defenders members’ concerns over 
environmental destruction.210 Additionally, whether a court finds causation 
and redressability can turn on how broadly the injury is characterized.211 
For example, if the injury is characterized as a loss of opportunity instead 
of a specific action, the harm will not be speculative and will be 
redressable.212  
Although familiar in the law, causation analysis “is subject to 
uncertainty and manipulation.”213 This uncertainty “may be misused as an 
excuse to avoid decision or confused with other more plausible reasons to 
 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1758–63 
(1999) (finding that Republican judges are four times more likely to vote to deny standing in 
environmental cases than Democratic judges); cf. Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 612, 617 (2004) (concluding that if clear precedent and effective judicial oversight exist, judges 
render predictable decisions but if either variable is absent, “federal judges are more likely to decide 
standing issues based on their own ideological preferences”).  
 207. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 228 (redressability). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the 
Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1463 (1988) (causation).  
 208. Roger Beers, Standing and Rights of Action in Environmental Litigation, in ALI-ABA CLE 
COURSE OF STUDY—ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION (June 22–25, 2005).  
 209. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 
669, 675–76, 678 (1973). Specifically, the recreational interests included camping, hiking, fishing, and 
sightseeing. Id. at 678. 
 210. Id. at 678.  
 211. Sunstein, supra note 207, at 1465.  
 212. Id.  
 213. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 27, § 3531.5.  
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avoid decision.”214 Causation analysis also often requires “considerable 
discovery, factfinding, and, worst of all, judicial speculation on the precise 
effects of regulatory initiatives.”215 Environmental plaintiffs must invest 
significant resources to gather evidence linking the government’s inaction 
with their environmental harm, but this process does not guarantee them a 
day in court. After collecting evidence, an environmental plaintiff’s fate 
turns on whether the judge finds that Congress intended the regulation to 
alleviate their harm. The causation inquiry is inefficient and wastes 
resources on a jurisdictional question.216  
Like the injury requirement, redressability often turns on a judge’s 
normative beliefs. The Court characterizes redressability as either “likely” 
or “speculative.” There is no clear way to measure whether government 
action will affect a third party.217 Since it is impossible to predict the effect 
of government action, it is left to the judge to choose the label for the 
proposed remedy. These “predictions of remedial benefit may be skewed 
so as to recognize, deny, or simply confuse standing.”218  
3. The Current Standing Doctrine Usurps Legislative Power 
Standing gives the judiciary power to circumvent legislative policy 
decisions. This malleability of the injury, causation, and redressability 
requirements increases judicial power by allowing judges to “decide which 
cases are to be heard on the basis of a bolstered ‘intuition’ rather than 
obedience to principle.”219 Standing takes control from the legislature and 
“disaggregates the citizenry; it is a judicial version of divide and 
conquer.”220  
Professor Richard Pierce argues that current standing doctrine 
eviscerates “the principle of legislative supremacy” for three reasons.221 
First, courts can dictate “which congressional policy decisions bind 
agencies.”222 Second, this decision “confers on agencies discretion to 
 
 
 214. Id.  
 215. Sunstein, supra note 207, at 1464.  
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 27, § 3531.6.  
 219. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1915, 1941 
(1986). 
 220. Winter, supra note 30, at 1313–14.  
 221. Richard J. Pierce, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on 
Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1200–01 (1993). 
 222. Id. at 1200  
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ignore many congressional policy decisions.”223 Third, denying standing 
prevents Congress from making “many judicially enforceable policy 
decisions”224 and disregards “the reality of these many layers of politically 
accountable judgments that originate in legislative choices.”225 Examining 
the ESA highlights Professor Pierce’s concerns. Two purposes of the ESA 
are to preserve endangered species and to protect their ecosystems.226 
Defenders of Wildlife upheld the Department of Interior’s finding that 
these policy decisions do not apply to international projects.227 Although 
Congress is not completely powerless because it could pass corrective 
legislation, the Court’s denial of standing still potentially prevents 
enforcement of congressional policy. Defenders of Wildlife’s denial of 
standing usurped Congress’s decision to protect endangered species.  
B. Other Proposed Solutions Will Not Adequately Correct the Problem 
1. Eliminating or Redefining Existing Standing Requirements  
Voluminous arguments have been made to eliminate or redefine 
existing standing requirements.228 These arguments ignore the 
stranglehold that the Court has placed on Congress’s ability to create 
enforceable rights and fail to address the standing doctrine’s historic 
theoretical flaws. According to Chief Justice Roberts, “[i]f Congress 
directs the federal courts to hear a case in which the requirements of 
Article III are not met, that Act of Congress is unconstitutional.”229 
Although Chief Justice Roberts’s general proposition is true, it assumes 
that the current standing jurisprudence is founded in Article III. The Court 
has constantly contradicted itself and failed to consistently define 
 
 
 223. Id.  
 224. Id.  
 225. William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
247, 277 (2001). Cf. Harold J. Krent, Laidlaw: Redressing the Law of Redressability, 12 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y F. 85, 109–17 (2001) (arguing that judicial review insures the proper application of the 
redressability requirement by Congress). 
 226. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006). 
 227. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 558–59 (1992).  
 228. See, e.g., David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment, and Other Contested 
Terms, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 79, 127–28 (2004) (“[C]ourts should consider whether the injury 
complained of is of the type the statute seeks to prevent and whether it threatens the health and 
longevity of the social system.”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68 (1984) 
(advocating for a more rudimentary injury inquiry); Pierce, supra note 206, at 1776 (arguing for a 
“broad, permissive, and probabilistic approach to injury and causation”).  
 229. Roberts, supra note 83, at 1226.  
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standing.230 The only way to escape this morass, at least for environmental 
disputes, is to start over with congressionally defined rights in an Article I 
tribunal.  
2. Granting Environmental Objects the Right to Sue  
Several commentators advocate for granting environmental objects 
standing to adequately protect environmental interests.231 Dissenting in 
Sierra Club v. Morton, Justice Douglas provided support for animal 
actions by arguing for a federal rule that “allow[s] environmental issues to 
be litigated . . . in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, 
defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the 
subject of public outrage.”232 The debate has surfaced in several lower 
federal courts.233 This argument, however, ignores the common law’s 
 
 
 230. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Issues Raised by Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services: Access to the Courts for Environmental Plaintiffs, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 207, 243 
(2001). 
 231. See, e.g., Katherine A. Burke, Can We Stand for It? Amending the Endangered Species Act 
with an Animal-Suit Provision, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 633 (2004) (proposing amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the ESA to allow animals to bring their own suits); Elizabeth L. 
DeCoux, In the Valley of Dry Bones: Reuniting the Word “Standing” with Its Meaning in Animal 
Cases, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 681 (2005) (arguing that a guardian should be 
capable of establishing standing to protect the interests of animals); James Dumont, Beyond Standing: 
Proposals for Congressional Response to Supreme Court “Standing” Decisions, 13 VT. L. REV. 675 
(1989) (arguing that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments give Congress vast power 
to grant standing to plaintiffs currently denied standing); Joseph Mendelson, III, Should Animals Have 
Standing? A Review of Standing Under the Animal Welfare Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 795 
(1997) (proposing to effectively implement the Animal Welfare Act third parties should be able to 
bring claims on behalf of animals); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward 
Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972) (presenting a philosophical and legal 
analysis for the creation of legal rights for natural objects by tracing the development of rights for 
other groups); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (With Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. 
REV. 1333 (2000) (arguing that animals should have standing to protect their own legal interests); 
Lauren Magnotti, Note, Pawing Open the Courthouse Door: Why Animals’ Interests Should Matter 
When Courts Grant Standing, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 455 (2006).  
 232. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 233. The Ninth Circuit has argued that the Constitution does not limit Congress’s power to grant 
standing to animals. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying 
standing to a group of whales, porpoises, and dolphins but finding that “nothing in the text of Article 
III explicitly limits the ability to bring a claim in federal court to humans”). Environmental groups 
often list nonhumans as plaintiffs, but the groups also list organizations to ensure that they meet 
standing requirements. See, e.g., Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 126 F.3d 
461, 466 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997); Mount Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1447 n.13 (9th 
Cir. 1992); Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Salmon v. Pac. 
Lumber Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Cal. 1998); Marbled Murrelet (Brachyramphus Marmoratus) v. Pac. 
Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Hawaiian Crow (‘Alala) v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549 
(D. Haw. 1991); N. Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991); N. Spotted Owl 
(Strix Occidentalis Caurina) v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988). Two courts of appeals 
appear to have used the animal’s perspective when addressing standing requirements. See, e.g., 
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focus on injury to the person. Therefore, creating rights in environmental 
objects would significantly depart from our legal foundations.234 
Furthermore, despite potentially relaxing the injury requirement, 
environmental objects would still face causation and redressability 
problems.  
The problems that arise from the Court’s inconsistent application of 
Article III standing will be transposed into a new context. First, the 
purpose of allowing environmental object plaintiffs is to satisfy the injury 
requirement. Animals facing habitat destruction or pollution are directly 
harmed, satisfying the injury prong.235 Although the injury requirement 
seems straightforward, an injured environmental object still must 
demonstrate future harm.236 The demonstration of future harm could lead 
to anomalous results like in Lyons.237 Second, multiple factors affect tiny 
ecosystems. Pinpointing the cause of injuries suffered by individual 
plaintiffs would be fairly difficult.238 Third, a favorable court decision 
must redress a plaintiff’s injury.239 Courts typically order compensation 
for injured plaintiffs, but compensation likely would be useless to redress 
direct environmental harm. Injunctions present a viable alternative but are 
still potentially problematic because they do not guarantee a tangible 
benefit to environmental objects.240 Although granting organisms standing 
might remedy some environmental harm, the Court’s inconsistent 
application of Article III standing requirements would still create gaps in 
the enforcement of environmental legislation.  
 
 
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 148 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 1998) (analyzing 
the causation and traceability requirements from the Loggerhead Turtle’s perspective); Palila v. Haw. 
Dep’t of Land and Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (analyzing the injury requirement from 
the Palila’s perspective).  
 234. Stone, supra note 231, at 459–64.  
 235. Burke, supra note 231, at 651. 
 236. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 45 (1983), the Court required a demonstration of 
future harm, despite previous injury, to challenge a police department’s chokehold policy. Id. at 111. 
The Court further found that “a federal court may not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no 
more than assert that certain practices of law enforcement officers are unconstitutional.” Id. But see 
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 148 F.3d 1231, 1247–56 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that 
loggerhead turtles met the causation and redressability requirements despite defendant’s argument that 
multiple sources affected loggerhead turtles’ nesting habits).  
 237. Lyons, 46 U.S. at 111.  
 238. See Salmon v. Pac. Lumber Co, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1234–35 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“The 
dramatic reduction in the . . . salmon population has been due to many natural and man-made 
conditions, including long-term trends in atmospheric conditions, . . . the predation of . . . salmon by 
California Sea Lions and Pacific Harbor Seals, and commercial timber harvesting.”). 
 239. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 182 (2000). 
 240. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973); supra note 133.  
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3. Establishing Property Rights in Environmental Resources  
Creating property rights in environmental resources ignores a 
fundamental purpose of environmental law—to correct market failures. It 
has been argued that “the establishment of property rights in 
environmental resources would both encourage greater resource 
stewardship and resolve the standing muddle created by inconsistent court 
opinions.”241 The creation of property rights is intended to promote 
conservation in the private sector.242 This proposal assumes that owners 
will be interested in the long term sustainability of their resources. 
Environmental law was created to correct for market failures where people 
did not adequately protect the environment.243 Although in some instances 
creating a property interest may lead to greater environmental 
protection,244 relying on market forces could also facilitate abandoning 
environmental protection to promote short term wealth maximization.245 
VII. PROPOSAL 
By creating an Article I environmental tribunal, Congress could avoid 
the amorphous application of Article III standing. The judiciary’s sole 
purpose is to “decide on the rights of individuals.”246 In contrast, 
“vindicating the public interest . . . is the function of Congress and the 
Chief Executive.”247 Therefore, the proper forum to enforce the public’s 
interest in the environment is an Article I tribunal for environmental 
claims (“Proposed Tribunal”).248  
 
 
 241. Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 
12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 70 (2001). See also Sunstein, supra note 27, at 234–35.  
 242. Adler, supra note 241, at 71.  
 243. See Lin, supra note 7. 
 244. Adler, supra note 241, at 71–73 (listing examples from Zimbabwe, New Zealand, and 
Iceland where creating property interests has led to greater environmental protection).  
 245. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).  
 246. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
 247. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992). For an argument that Article II 
precludes Congress from delegating the power to protect the interests of the public as a whole, see 
Harold J. Kent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793 
(1993).  
 248. Article III courts consist of life-tenured judges with protected salaries and were created to 
decide Article III cases and controversies. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 4.1 (4th 
ed. 2003). In contrast, judges in Article I tribunals sit for fixed terms and only address specific 
subjects. Id. See generally Judith Resknik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 581 (1985).  
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A. Supreme Court Precedent  
The Proposed Tribunal meets the Court’s standards for Article I 
tribunals. The Proposed Tribunal could be limited to the enforcement of 
statutory rights created by specific environmental legislation. This would 
ensure that it is adjudicating cases about pure public rights. Pure public 
rights “originate in a statute enacted by Congress . . . and the government 
is always a party, seeking to protect the public health, safety, or welfare by 
enforcing or defending such laws.”249 Relying on substantive rights 
created in environmental legislation avoids the Court’s concerns in 
Northern Pipeline250 by limiting the jurisdiction to inherently public 
matters. Additionally, the Proposed Tribunal would be within Thomas’s 
limits251 since it would be enforcing a governmental regulatory scheme. 
Finally, the factors from Schor252 heavily favor the constitutionality of the 
Proposed Tribunal. The historical analysis reveals that public rights 
disputes have frequently been removed from the confines of Article III 
courts.253 Additionally, the rights to be enforced are not constitutional 
rights but are congressional creations.254 Finally, the congressional 
purposes of protecting public health and the environment provide strong 
reasons for creating the Proposed Tribunal.  
B. Separation of Powers 
Justice Scalia’s separation of powers analysis in environmental 
standing decisions supports establishing the Proposed Tribunal. Justice 
Scalia has repeatedly emphasized his reluctance to grant standing in 
environmental cases because of the potential usurpation of executive 
power.255 He has reasoned that allowing an individual to assert a 
 
 
 249. Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REV. 
1037, 1073–74 (1999); cf. James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial 
Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004) (attempting to narrow the scope of the 
public rights exception and focusing on the framer’s use of the word “tribunal” in Article I). 
 250. N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 78 (1982). 
 251. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 594 (1985). 
 252. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986). 
 253. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 Howard) 272 (1856).  
 254. See supra Part III. 
 255. In Defenders of Wildlife, Scalia argued that  
[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ 
compliance with the law into an “individual right” vindicable in the courts is to permit 
Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important 
constitutional duty, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (citations omitted). 
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generalized claim would allow the courts “to assume a position of 
authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal 
department.”256 Furthermore, Justice Scalia finds some concrete injuries 
too general to support a congressional conferral of standing.257 Justice 
Scalia’s separation of powers argument leaves no options within Article 
III courts to assert general environmental claims. Therefore, the only place 
to assert such claims is within the legislative or executive branches.  
Article I supports the formation of the Proposed Tribunal. The 
Proposed Tribunal conforms to the Court’s separation of powers analysis. 
The enumerated legislative powers include the ability to provide for the 
“welfare of the United States.”258 Environmental legislation serves the 
purpose of correcting “market failures” and “ensuring that an adequate 
supply of public goods, such as clean air and water, is available to the 
public.”259 This is within the ambit of legislative power. Additionally, 
Congress has the ability to effectuate its purpose of ensuring effective 
environmental legislation through the Necessary and Proper Clause.260 
Further, allowing the President to appoint the tribunal’s members subject 
to congressional approval likely will avoid a potential Article II 
challenge.261  
C. The EPA  
The EPA would be an inadequate forum for addressing environmental 
disputes.262 Although it seems appropriate to give the EPA greater 
adjudicatory power, the Court’s treatment of administrative agencies 
makes the EPA an ineffective forum. The Court often limits the 
enforcement power of administrative agencies and classifies them as 
 
 
 256. Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1993). Justice Scalia found that “the law of standing 
roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities 
against impositions of the majority, and excludes them from the more undemocratic role of prescribing 
how the other two branches should function to serve the interest of the majority itself.” Scalia, supra 
note 82, at 894. 
 257. Scalia, supra note 82, at 895–96 (using the example of a governmental action which affects 
“all who breathe” and believing that this injury could be resolved by the normal political process). 
 258. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 Howard) 272, 281 
(1855). 
 259. Lin, supra note 7.  
 260. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 Howard) at 281. 
 261. See Springer v. Gov’t of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) (“Legislative power, as 
distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint 
the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement.”); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138–
41 (1976) (finding that vindication of public rights must be conducted by officers appointed by the 
executive).  
 262. See supra note 13. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/8
p 1907 Hodits book pages.doc10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] THE FATAL FLAW OF STANDING 1939 
 
 
 
 
adjuncts of Article III courts.263 In this role, the EPA would require a 
federal district court to implement any decision.264 EPA adjudication still 
subjects environmental disputes to Article III standing when the litigant 
seeks enforcement. Additionally, agencies like the EPA have been subject 
to agency “capture” by political pressure from the regulated industry.265 
The power of well-organized private interest groups has prevented the 
implementation of statutory enactments that harm regulated industries.266 
Increased EPA adjudicatory authority likewise would be subject to 
industry pressure. This would prevent the enforcement of environmental 
policy. The Proposed Tribunal could escape similar political pressure by 
providing its members lengthy tenures and prohibiting their removal 
except for good cause.  
D. Due Process Standards 
Appellate review is not required for all Article I tribunals, but the 
courts of appeals and Supreme Court could provide limited review of the 
Proposed Tribunal’s decisions.267 The Court “possesses no jurisdiction 
over some cases initially tried before military tribunals,” and Article III 
appellate review “is never available as of right.”268 Therefore, federal court 
review is not required for Article I tribunals to meet due process 
requirements. However, Congress usually provides for the oversight of 
inferior tribunals by the federal judiciary.269 The courts of appeals could 
exercise limited review of the Proposed Tribunal’s decisions through writs 
of mandamus.270 This allows federal court review without subjecting 
plaintiffs to a standing inquiry. Finally, decisions of the Proposed Tribunal 
could create a constitutionally recognized injury that would allow 
 
 
 263. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51–65 (1932)  
 264. N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 78 (1982). 
 265. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 168.  
 266. Id. 
 267. Several commentators have argued that some form of Article III court review is necessary for 
Article I tribunals to pass constitutional muster. See Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: 
Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988); 
Richard B. Saphire and Michael E. Solimine, Shoring up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the 
Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85, 87–88 (1988) (advocating for meaningful Article III 
court review). 
 268. Fallon, supra note 267, at 973.  
 269. Pfander, supra note 249, at 721.  
 270. Id. at 724–25.  
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appellate court review.271 This would move the Court’s focus beyond 
standing and to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. 
E. The Seventh Amendment  
The Seventh Amendment does not prevent the formation of the 
Proposed Tribunal. Court precedent “has said that the Article III and 
Seventh Amendment analyses are the same, so that if the public rights 
doctrine or the balancing test allows Congress to assign a matter to a non-
Article III court, it can do so without providing a jury.”272 Therefore, the 
Seventh Amendment analysis is coextensive with the public rights 
analysis. Since it should be found that the Proposed Tribunal is 
adjudicating pure public rights, no Seventh Amendment concerns should 
arise.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s amorphous application of Article III standing requirements 
has allowed environmental harm to go uncorrected. Even drastic doctrinal 
reform would still subject the environment to the Court’s ubiquitous 
Article III standing requirements. Therefore, to provide adequate 
protection for the environment, an Article I tribunal should be created.  
Timothy C. Hodits* 
 
 
 271. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617–18 (1989) (granting certiorari in a case that 
originally would not meet federal standing requirements when the state court judgment caused direct, 
specific, and concrete injury). 
 272. Sward, supra note 249, at 1098. See also Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh 
Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional 
Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407 (1995).  
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